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ABSTRACT 
 High world food prices after 2006 concerned governments across the globe. Among 
various contributing factors, biofuels have received wide attention in recent years with more and 
more studies analyzing the implication of biofuel policies on global food supply and demand 
conditions. Relying on a model based upon U.S. biofuel policies, this paper studies the price 
links between crop and energy commodities induced by biofuel production, and simulates 
commodity price changes due to market and policy shifts. Results suggest price links exist 
between crop and energy commodities but more accurate measurement of commodity price 
changes induced by different market conditions will require the construction of a more detailed 
structural model. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2007-08 world food price crisis caught most governments off guard. Within a few 
months after the second half of 2007, all grain and oilseed prices tripled (de Gorter, Drabik, and 
Just, 2015). Widespread riots and protests ensued in Asian and African countries as citizens 
demanded access to basic food. Meanwhile, though the United States was going through the 
Great Recession, high food prices did not spare the domestic market.  
The phenomena perplexed economists. At first, researchers listed a plethora of factors 
that could have contributed to the crisis: nations’ lax monetary policies, fiscal expansions of 
countries, weak US dollars, high oil prices, decreasing stocks, financial speculation, and natural 
disasters among many other explanations (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010; Heady and Fan, 2008). The 
traditional supply and demand framework still seemed to rule as food prices took a dive in 2009 
and reamined low in 2010. Everything appeared to be just the product of another boom and bust 
business cycle with mean reversion until food prices started a new round of increase in 2011. 
While rice and wheat prices did not beat their record levels in 2008, corn and soybean prices 
reached new highs. Confusion spread and governors across the world demanded better 
explanation as economists ventured into new directions. 
One sector that attracted wide attention was the biofuel industry. First originated from the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, the Renewable Fuel Standard requires the blending of a minimum 
volume of renewable energy into transportation fuels in the United States each year. Among the 
miscellaneous products blenders can use to meet the annual blend goals, corn ethanol and 
soybean biodiesel stand out as two products that are both easier to produce and market. 
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Beginning in 2005, corn ethanol production capacity quickly expanded, starting from less than 4 
billion gallons per year to over 14 billion gallons per year in 2011 (EIA, 2017). Meanwhile, 
biodiesel production also increased from 90.7 million gallons in 2005 to 967.5 million gallons in 
2011 (EIA, 2017). Biofuel production expansion naturally drew stocks from the corn and 
soybean markets. With stable domestic crop production levels between 2005 and 2011, biofuels’ 
share had been increasing over time. This new relationship between crop and energy led to the 
questioning of possible price links established. 
Contrary to some of the other investigations that often model the new source of crop 
demand from biofuels as a rightward shift in the crop demand curve, we use the economic 
framework developed by de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2015) that pays close attention to the 
deeper meaning of the implication of biofuel policies to study the price links between crop and 
energy. In Chapter 2, we will discuss the price relationships between crop and energy before and 
after the enactment of the Renewable Fuel Standard, what other researchers have done for the 
field, and the economic analysis framework we will develop and use. In Chapter 3, we will use 
both time-series econometric analysis and reduced-form models based on the theory framework 
in Chapter 2 to investigate the price relationships between different crop and energy 
commodities. In Chapter 4, we will explore the implication of different market and policy change 
scenarios to the crop and energy markets. Lastly, we will sum up our findings and make 
recommendations for future research in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ENERGY AND CROP PRICE LINKS 
 The interaction between the crop and energy markets has received wide attention after the 
implementation of the 2005 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and the occurrence of the 2007 
global food crisis. This chapter will discuss the linkages between the two markets with and 
without the RFS and then we will introduce an analysis framework based on biofuel policies. 
The economic theories in this chapter will guide the development of the empirical models in 
Chapter 3. 
2.1 The Energy and Crop Price Links before the Biofuel Era 
 After the first gasoline-motored tractor appeared in 1892, crop production in the U.S. has 
gradually evolved into an energy intensive process with agricultural modernization in machinery, 
fertilizer, and chemicals (Janick, 2008). This process has continued in the biofuel era. 
Before the great expansion in the production of biofuel in 2006, oil and energy prices 
used to influence crop prices through the channels of production and marketing (Baffes, 2007). 
Farming machines used in crop production are mostly fuel-based (direct energy usage) and the 
manufacturing of fertilizers and chemicals require fuels (indirect energy usage). Using the two 
most common Midwestern agricultural commodities (both energy-intensive) as examples, Figure 
2.1.1 shows the cost ratios of energy (both direct and indirect) in the production of corn and 
soybean across the United States in recent years. In general, energy accounts for more than 40% 
and 50% of the operating cost of soybean and corn respectively. The costs of fertilizer, 
chemicals, and fuel, lube, and electricity each made up 41.14%, 8.37%, and 6.38% of the total 
operating cost of corn, and 20.04%, 16.15%, and 8.24% of the total operating cost of soybean in 
2015 respectively (ERS, USDA, 2017). For the marketing channel, transportation cost of farm 
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products with trucks and trains also adds to a significant portion of the retail price consumers pay 
for food. Depending on the weight and value ratio, perishability, and consumers’ taste, the 
marketing margin of a crop can be very large. 
We now examine the crop and energy price link before 2006. As shown in Figure 2.1.2, a 
quick inspection of the prices of corn and ethanol does not suggest the two commodities have a 
strong link prior to the beginning of the mass production of biofuels in 2006. Meanwhile, as the 
crude oil price started to increase in 2004, corn price followed its upward trend through input 
transmission in the energy and crop link (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010).  
This crop and energy price relationship through the input channel held before 2006.  
2.2 The Beginning of the Biofuel Era 
 Biofuels are biomass-based transportation fuels, including ethanol and biodiesel, that are 
often “blended with petroleum fuels” to be sold at gas stations (EIA, 2017). Due to the multiple 
goals biofuel policies aim to achieve, such as emission reduction, energy independence, and 
increasing famers’ income, policies sourced in environmental, energy, agricultural, and 
international trade goals all can influence the biofuel industry (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 
2015). Since the beginning of the mass production of biofuels in the U.S. in 2006, there have 
been major changes in the patterns of crop and fuel production along with the industry’s 
expansion. This section will highlight the key policies and phenomena that have been parts of the 
rise of biofuel. 
 As the main purpose of this thesis is to examine the links between crops and energy, we 
will focus on those key policies that have induced the links. In particular, we will explain how  
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Figure 2.1.1 Energy Costs as Ratios of Corn and Soybean Production Operating Cost 
Source: Commodity Costs and Returns, Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture 
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Figure 2.1.2 Crude Oil, Ethanol, and Corn Prices January 2000 – December 2006 
Source: Ethanol and Unleaded Gasoline Average Rack Prices, Nebraska Government 
Feed Grains Database, USDA, Economic Research Service 
Commodity Markets, the World Bank
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the ban of MTBE, an oxygenate for gasoline, and the federal legislations passed in the early 
2000s have contributed towards the growth in the biofuel industry (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 
2015).   
In the early 1920s, gasoline producers blended tetraethyl lead into gasoline to reduce 
engine knocking, unwanted combustions of pockets of air and fuel mixture outside the 
designated engine chamber area that could lead to engine failures (British Medical Journal, 
1928). However, due to concerns of lead poisoning through car exhaust, the US Congress and 
EPA together pushed the enforcement of the Clean Air Act first introduced in 1970, banning 
tetraethyl lead as an additive and substituting it with either MTBE or ethanol  as an oxygenate 
that also boosts gasoline’s octane level (EPA, 2017).  However, the highly water-soluble MTBE 
from leaking underground storage tanks (LUST) was soon found in underground water and states 
banned its use in the early 2000s due to its nature as a potential carcinogen, leaving ethanol as 
the only viable alternative to boost octane number (Squillace, Pope, and Price, 1995).  
Meanwhile, crude oil price continued to increase in the early 2000s, and the domestic 
biofuel industry had been developing since the 1980s with programs including the Small Ethanol 
Producer Tax Credit, reaching a production capacity of 1.8 billion gallons and using 7% of U.S. 
corn crops in 2001 (Schnepf, 2010).  The federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) of 2005, later 
expanded in 2007, became effective and mandated the consumption of 13.95 billion gallons of 
renewable fuel in 2011 (almost seven times more than the industry’s total capacity in 2001) and 
the blending of ethanol into gasoline (EPA, 2017). Though RFS did not offer any direct tax 
credit or subsidy for the biofuel industry, its existence created a guaranteed market and raised 
biofuel products’ prices compared to their levels without the mandate (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 
2013). 
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 The production of biofuel has taken off ever since with both government and industry’s 
efforts and technology advancement in car engines. Figure 2.2.1 shows the expansion of the 
ethanol production capacity over the past decade under the EPA’s RFS. As of 2015, ethanol’s 
production capacity reached 15.5 billion gallons, consisting of 75.6% of EPA’s 20.5 billion 
renewable consumption goal that year if all plants produced at full capacities (Nebraska 
Government, 2017). In November 2015, the Obama Administration ordered the blending of 14.5 
billion gallons of ethanol into gasoline in 2016, making up more than 10% of US gasoline sold at 
pumps (Parker, 2015). Oil companies have warned about going above the E10 blend wall 
(having more than 10% of ethanol in the gasoline mixture) would potentially cause damage to 
car engines (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 2015). However, E15 is now available in 28 states and 
EPA approved its usage in cars manufactured in 2001 and later, which now make up more than 
80% of the cars on the road (Renewable Fuel Association, 2015). Nevertheless, the annual blend 
goals of EPA’s current RFS is very likely to restrict the further expansion in the production of 
traditional biofuel (like ethanol) with its conventional biofuel blend cap maxed out at 15 billion 
gallons per year from 2015 onward (EPA, 2017). 
Meanwhile, expansion in biofuel production in the past decade has also led to major 
changes in corn usage. Table 2.2.1 shows the increasing share of ethanol production from corn 
production. Though this ratio is unlikely to increase due to the blend cap of RFS, it consists a 
major portion of total corn usage. Despite the diversion of ethanol production, however, U.S. 
remains the world’s largest corn exporter, contributing 39.8% of the total corn traded in 2016 
(FAS, USDA, 2017).  
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Figure 2.2.1 U.S. Fuel Ethanol Production Capacity in Million Gallons by Month 
Source: Ethanol Production Capacity by Plant, Nebraska Government 
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Table 2.2.1 Corn Production and Ethanol Usage in the United States 
 Corn Production 
(million bushels) 
Ethanol and DDG Related 
Corn Usage  
(million bushels) 
Ethanol and DDG Corn 
Usage Percentage 
(%) 
2006 10,531 2,119 20.12 
2007 13,038 3,049 23.39 
2008 12,092 3,709 30.67 
2009 13,092 4,591 35.07 
2010 12,447 5,019 40.32 
2011 12,360 5,000 40.45 
2012 10,755 4,641 43.15 
2013 13,899 5,123 36.86 
2014 14,216 5,208 36.63 
2015 13,601 5,206 38.28 
2016 15,148 5,325 35.15 
Source: USDA, NASS, Crop Production 2016 Summary / USDA, ERS Feed Outlook Jan. 17, 17 
 Biodiesel production has also increased since 2006 as shown in Figure 2.2.2. Compared 
to the more stable ethanol production growth, the government’s tax credit (consumption subsidy) 
for biodiesel, an important factor to make its production viable, has not been very consistent 
since 2006.  The one dollar production subsidy elapsed in 2010, 2012, and 2015 respectively, 
creating great uncertainties for the industry in those years. Table 2.2.2 reflects the soybeans used 
as feedstock for biodiesel productions in the past few years.  
Table 2.2.2 Soybean Production and Biodiesel Usage in the United States 
 Soybean Production 
(Million Bushels) 
Biodiesel Related 
Soybean Usage 
(Million Bushels) 
Biodiesel Soybean Usage 
Percentage 
(%) 
2011 3,094 404 13.06 
2012 3,042 400 13.15 
2013 3,358 428 12.75 
2014 3,927 442 11.26 
2015 3,981 478 12.01 
Source: Biodiesel Usage, Projections & Soybean Balance Sheet, Wisner, 2015 
2.3 Literature on the Crop and Energy Price Links 
 With biofuel production stepping up and crop usage volume expanding in the late 2000s, 
the impact of biofuel policies on food prices has attracted wide attention. Researchers have   
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Figure 2.2.2 US Monthly Biofuel Production in Million Gallons 
Source: EIA Monthly Energy Review, Table 10.3 & 10.4
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suggested numerous economic theory models and econometric techniques to study the subject, 
but results do not always agree with each other as the relative young body of literature continues 
to evolve.  
We begin our discussion with the pioneering research in the early years of large-scale 
biofuel production after the enactment of the 2005 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) and the 
global food crisis between 2007 and 2008. Headey and Fan (2008) suggested oil prices, USD 
exchange rates, crop demand from biofuel, and other commodity specific characteristics were 
important factors behind the 2007 food crisis. Rosegrant et al. (2008) simulated global biofuel 
production scenarios and pointed out the expansion of biofuel industry would result in major 
increase in global food prices. de Gorter and Just (2009) proposed a framework to study the 
effect of biofuel’s consumer tax credit and contingent farm subsidy based on a price model that 
linked gasoline, ethanol, and corn. Balcombe and Rapsomanikis (2008) detected long-term 
relationships among the prices of oil, ethanol, and sugar prices in Brazil, the second largest 
biofuel production country in the world.  
 More investigations followed these foundational work. Overall, researchers tend to agree 
that biofuel was one of the causes of the recent global food price booms (Headey and Fan, 2008; 
Roberts and Wolfram, 2013; Rosegrant et al., 2008; Zilberman et al., 2013; de Gorter and Just, 
2009; Tyner, 2010; Balcombe and Rapsomanikis, 2008) and biofuel policies across the world 
have created price links between energy and crops (Tyner, 2010; Serra et al., 2011; Serra, 
Zilberman, and Gil, 2011). In particular, Tyner (2010) believed that the price link between crude 
oil and corn could be severed by the E10 blend wall when oil price is high. However, researchers 
cannot agree on whether biofuel is the most important factor that induced the turmoil in the 
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global food market and estimates of the amount of induced price increase differ significantly 
(Serra and Zilberman, 2013). 
 In general, researchers have used one of four approaches to gauge the impact of biofuel 
production on crop and energy prices: (1) the Marshallian supply and demand model, (2) the 
Marshallian supply and demand model with inventory, (3) time-series econometric analysis 
based on quarterly or annual data, and (4) time-series econometric analysis based on daily, 
weekly, and monthly data (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 2015). de Gorter, Drabik, and Just 
explained that approaches (1) and (3) tend to give little credit to biofuel policies for the rising 
crop prices while arguing a series of coincidental events had caused the food price crisis. 
Meanwhile, they also elaborated on how approach (2) usually models the new biofuel policies to 
cause kinks in the demand curve of crops, resulting in the argument of biofuel production to have 
major impact on crop prices. Last but not least, de Gorter, Drabik, and Just stated the empirical 
results using approach (4) are extremely variable despite often usage of the latest econometric 
techniques, stemming from researchers’ misunderstanding of the relationship between some of 
the commodity price pairs.  
 We believe the combination of a more in-depth understanding of the US biofuel policies 
and some microeconomic theory fundamentals will contribute to the discussion of the crop and 
energy price linkages, and the results of the four approaches above may be improved with 
incorporation. Like US farm bills, US biofuel policies are complex, evolving, and influential as 
these tie the markets of energy and crop with ambitious policy goals.  Moreover, the biofuel 
production industry in the U.S. is largely a policy-induced business that is still highly dependent 
on government’s future decisions (taking the influential one dollar per gallon tax credit on 
biodiesel production as an example).  
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2.4 The Crop and Energy Price Links: A Model of Policies and Plant Operating Conditions 
 Building upon others’ work and our understanding of the US biofuel policies, we discuss 
the variables, data, and price linkages of our crop and energy price linkage model. 
 As shown in Figure 2.4.1, we will use the following model.  
 
Figure 2.4.1 Crop and Energy Price Linkages in the Biofuel Era 
 The discussion of biofuels in this paper is limited to transportation fuels, including 
gasoline, diesel, ethanol, and biodiesel only. Though multiple feedstocks are available for the 
production of ethanol and biodiesel, we will focus on the most widely used corn (Department of 
Energy, 2017) and soybean oil (Wisner, 2013).  
 Figure 2.4.1 shows the main commodity prices used to study the energy and crop price 
links after the introduction of RFS. All prices, except biodiesel, are collected at the daily level 
beginning in January 2007. Weekly biodiesel prices are available starting April 2007. We focus 
our analysis on the monthly price data in Chapter 4. This choice helps us reduce short-term 
noise, such as the impact of minor accidents at refineries, while capturing the effects of major 
events like Hurricane Katrina and Rita.  
Crude Oil
Gasoline Ethanol Corn
Diesel Biodiesel
Soybean
Soybean Oil
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Due to the long list of coefficients and variables used in this study besides those prices in 
Table 2.4.1, we provide detailed information for the rest of the data of the study in the data 
description component of the data files.  
Table 2.4.1 Main Energy and Crop Commodity Price Data 
Commodity Description Data Source 
Crude Oil Europe Brent Spot Price Free On Board (FOB), 
$/barrel 
Energy Information 
Administration 
Gasoline New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline 
Regular Spot Price FOB, $/gallon 
Energy Information 
Administration 
Diesel New York Harbor Ultra-Low Sulfur No 2 
Diesel Spot Price, $/gallon 
Energy Information 
Administration 
Ethanol Iowa Fuel Ethanol Price from a Representative 
Plant, $/gallon 
CARD, Iowa State University 
Biodiesel Iowa Fuel Biodiesel Price from a 
Representative Plant, $/gallon 
CARD, Iowa State University 
Corn Iowa Corn Price a Representative Plant Pays, 
$/bushel 
CARD, Iowa State University 
Soybean Number 1 Yellow Soybeans, $/bushel United States Department of 
Agriculture 
 
To disentangle the relationship between crop and energy price linkages, we start with 
Figure 2.4.1. Unlike some other researchers, such as Nazlioglu and Soytas (2011), who directly 
study the price relationship between crude oil and crops, we break the energy and crop price 
linkages into three stages, namely the crude oil — energy (gasoline and diesel) link, the energy 
— biofuel link, and the biofuel — crop link. We believe this analysis framework can reveal how 
price transmission, linkage, and divergence occur for different reasons at each individual level, 
whereas lumping everything together through the crude oil and crop price linkage may not 
always pinpoint the specific causes of energy and crop price changes. The later scenario will 
impede policies’ ability to address crop and energy price issues.  
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The crude oil — energy price linkage is the first layer of the analysis framework. In this 
paper, we are not concerned about the study of the supply and demand of crude oil that 
influences oil price levels. Rather, we are interested in the reasons in the divergence between 
crude oil and energy prices. The most common cause is unexpected shocks. When natural 
disasters hit, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, refineries get destroyed or shut down. Even if 
there is no change in regional supply of crude oil, energy prices will rise in the short run due to 
production decrease with the loss in capacities. Seasonality may also be the reason. Gasoline 
tends to be sold at a premium when there is a lot of travel in the summer and diesel is in high 
demand during harvest season. Last but not least, input cost, such as the cost of natural gas and 
electricity, can also affect energy prices in the short run. 
 The energy — biofuel price link is policy-based and there are two different regimes under 
which the price link varies. As we mentioned earlier, the RFS has made the blending of certain 
amounts of ethanol and biodiesel into gasoline and diesel each year mandatory, making biofuels 
complements to gasoline and diesel. Under this scenario, consumers will have to use biofuel 
even if they would not otherwise, resulting in a price premium for biofuels, and we call that 
scenario the mandate premium regime (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 2015). Under this scenario, 
the price of biofuels can be higher than regular fuels. Alternatively, biofuel producers can also 
manufacture biofuels to compete against fuels as substitutes, and the federal government has 
offered both ethanol and biodiesel a blender’s tax credit in the past to help the growth of the 
industry. In this situation, the energy content of biofuels (which is lower than regular fuels in 
terms of lower mileage per gallon) together with the tax credit will set a price floor for biofuels, 
and we call it a tax credit regime (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 2015). Under this scenario, the 
prices of biofuels are lower than regular fuels without tax credits. The price divergence between 
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fuels and biofuels shall be guided by one of the two states. This price link, however, can be 
severed when production or marketing constraints of biofuels come into play.  
 Last but not least, the biofuel — crop price link can experience divergence when there are 
biofuel production capacity or marketing channel constraints as well. If biofuel production sites 
are running at full capacity and biofuels sell at a premium, crop prices will be higher than when 
the tax credit regime is binding. Marketing constraints will prevent more biofuels being blended, 
reducing the amount of crops used for biofuel production.  
  Besides the above new price linkages between crop and energy commodity pairs, crude 
oil still influences the prices of biofuels and crops through the input channel. As we have 
mentioned earlier, corn and soybean productions are both energy intensive. The production and 
blending of biofuels also require energy connected to crude oil. However, with the maturing of 
the US biofuel industry and the blend mandate being firmly in place, such influence is not as 
strong compared to the price links induced by biofuel productions.  
 In Chapter 2, we have built the theoretical analysis framework for crop and energy 
commodity prices that is dependent on biofuel polices. We will use the important concepts of the 
two states of nature in Chapter 3 for our empirical models.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EMPIRICAL MODELS OF ENERGY AND CROP PRICE LINKS 
 Beginning in 2006, the fast growth in biofuel production under the new Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS) created a direct link between biofuels and food grains and oilseeds. Building 
upon others’ findings and the relevant economic theories summarized from the literature in 
Chapter 2, this chapter will examine price links between corn and ethanol and soybean oil and 
biodiesel using time series empirical models. We will follow the flow diagram and channels 
presented in Figure 2.4.1 to study the links in the following order: crude oil and energy (gasoline 
and diesel), energy and biofuels (ethanol and biodiesel), and biofuels and crops (corn and 
soybean oil).  
3.1 The Link between Crude Oil and Energy Prices 
 As we explained in Chapter 2, there are several possible reasons crude oil and energy 
(gasoline and diesel) prices can diverge. In fact, even gasoline and diesel prices do not hold a 
strict relationship, which we will show below. Hence, we are left with three price relationships to 
examine: crude oil –gasoline, crude oil-diesel, and gasoline-diesel. We can only estimate the first 
two of the three price relationships as the third falls out of an identity. Thus, we develop our 
empirical models to discuss these price links. 
 In general, the literature suggests three categories of factors that influence the link 
between crude oil and energy prices: the price of inputs, seasonality, and unexpected shocks. We 
examine each category in turn. 
 An oil refinery’s operation requires the inputs of crude oil, natural gas, and electricity. 
During the refining process, crude oil is broken into oil products; some become final products 
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and others are used to fuel the process together with natural gas and electricity. Depending on the 
contract delivery date of crude oil and the market price of oil products, oil refineries may use 
their crude oil stocks from the previous period and adjust their idle capacities during a certain 
production period to try to capture more revenue. Crude oil has been the largest input cost 
component of energy prices historically. According to EIA, crude oil consists of 51% and 47% 
of the retail prices of a gallon of gasoline and diesel consumers pay at gas stations in January 
2017 (2017). The second biggest input cost rises from the refining of crude oil into petroleum 
products. Oil refining involves distillation, the process of separating crude oil into different 
products of various boiling points through heating, among many other steps. Major products of 
distillation include finished motor gasoline, distillate fuel oil (diesel and heating oil – otherwise 
identical products except color and tax), kerosene-type jet fuel, petroleum coke, still gas, 
liquefied refinery gas, residual fuel oil, and asphalt and road oil as shown in Table 3.1.0.11. 
Besides main products like gasoline and diesel, oil refineries use some of the by-products, such 
as still gas, from the distillation process together with natural gas and electricity to power their 
operations2. In these ways, crude oil, natural gas, and electricity together make up the largest 
component of refining cost. 
Seasonality in energy prices, including different consumption, production, and inventory 
patterns of petroleum products over a year, also affects price links. In general, consumers drive 
more over the summer and less in the winter, pushing refineries to stock up gasoline over winters 
and produce more gasoline in summers for the price premium. Meanwhile, the crop harvesting 
                                                             
1 According to EIA, a 42-gallon barrel of crude oil yields about 19 gallons of gasoline, 12 gallons of ultra-low sulfur 
distillate (e.g. ULSD No. 2 Diesel), 4 gallons of jet fuel, 6 gallons of other products, 1 gallon of heavy fuel oil 
(residual), 2 gallons of hydrocarbon gas liquids, and 1 gallon of other distillates (heating oil) in 2015.  
2 Refineries can change their yields of petroleum products to adjust for seasonal demands within certain technology 
constraints albeit operation cost changes. This will have an impact on the by-products used to fuel their operations. 
 20 
 
season every year induces a large amount of farm fuel consumption, causing a seasonal increase 
in diesel price. Heating oil is used for home heating in winters. Thus, oil refineries will adjust 
their productions to yield more distillate fuel oil to capture the diesel price premium while the 
gasoline price is seasonally lower. Moreover, refineries often conduct facility maintenance in the 
spring months, reducing overall refining capacities. When combining all these factors, these 
seasonal variations in demand and supply of petroleum products have a significant influence on 
price links.  
Table 3.1.0.1 2015 US Refinery Yield Breakdown 
Product Percentage 
Finished Motor Gasoline 46 
Distillate Fuel Oil 29.5 
Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel 9.6 
Petroleum Coke 5.2 
Still Gas 4.1 
Liquefied Refinery Gas 3.7 
Residual Fuel Oil 2.5 
Asphalt and Road Oil 2 
Other Products 3.8 
Source: Refinery Yield, Petroleum & Other Products, EIA 
 Unexpected shocks, including natural, political, and accidental events, will also alter the 
links between crude oil and energy prices. Natural disasters disrupt oil production in different 
ways, such as the destruction of production facilities and the increasing of shut-in wells (non-
operating wells capable of production). Hurricane Katrina and Rita each landed in the Gulf of 
Mexico (GOM) in August and September of 2005. The two hurricanes destroyed 113 platforms 
(Oynes, 2006) and the total capacity of shut-in wells was equivalent to 97.83% of GOM’s daily 
oil production at the end of September 2005 (MMS, 2005). Political events also influence the 
flow of crude oil and energy in the international market. To retaliate against the United States’ 
support of Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israel War, OPEC members imposed an embargo that 
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both banned petroleum exports to the U.S. and cut their oil production. With U.S. energy prices 
quadrupling and the weakening of the U.S. dollar, OPEC members succeeded in forcing the 
Nixon Administration to enter peace negotiations as it attempted to avert an eminent recession in 
an economy overly reliant on foreign oil supply (Department of State, 2017). Last but not least, 
accidents, such as refinery explosion, cause distortions to (regional) energy price relationships. 
Two major refinery explosions occurred in California in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, Buhl estimated 
the 2015 ExxonMobil explosion in Torrance would make Californian motorists pay at least $2.4 
billion more for energy in the six months that followed. Thus, though less frequent, these natural, 
political, and accidental events can sever the price links between crude oil and energy despite the 
effort through domestic reserve, regional redistribution, and foreign import to contain them.  
 Besides of these three categories of factors, we also include some common tools in time-
series data analysis: trend and autoregressive (AR) variables. When a time-series variable 
displays a trend, its observations show a certain pattern with or without smoothing or function-
fitting (such as logarithmic, exponential, and polynomial specifications). Any country’s annual 
nominal GDP across years, for example, often displays an upward trend in the absence of 
recession. On the other hand, past values often have an impact on the present value of a time-
series variable, making their inclusion in the analysis essential. As OPEC members continued the 
oil embargo against the U.S. in 1973, gasoline price double, tripled, and quadrupled in several 
months with the U.S. failing to acquire additional oil supply from its European and Asian allies 
(Department of State, 2017).  
 We use Model 3.1.0.1 below to study crude oil energy price links, where i = G or D 
(gasoline or diesel). 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 , and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 each represents crude oil, natural gas, and electricity price 
 22 
 
in a certain period. Using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (unit root test), we found the prices 
of crude oil, gasoline, diesel, natural gas, electricity are all non-stationary while the aggregate 
idle capacities of oil refineries and refineries’ crude oil stock to be stationary. However, the five 
non-stationary prices are all integrated of order one (their first differences are stationary) and the 
error resulted from using the non-stationary regression variables is stationary. Hence, the prices 
of gasoline (𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡) and diesel (𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) are co-integrated with the prices of crude oil, natural gas, and 
electricity with similar stochastic trends. The results of least square estimation therefore won’t be 
spurious and we are safe to proceed. This result is not surprising based on our discussion of the 
relationships among these commodities above. 
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺  𝐺𝐺𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  = 𝑓𝑓(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺  𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺  𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1,𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1 ,𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1 ,  
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1  𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1  ,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠,  
𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖) (3.1.0.1) 
 
*t refers to a variable’s value in month t. t-1 refers to the variable’s value in the previous month. 
 
3.1.1 The Link between Crude Oil and Gasoline Prices 
The first model links crude oil (𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and gasoline prices (𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁). For production inputs, we 
include the prices of crude oil, natural gas, and electricity and plus a measure of idle refinery 
capacity and refineries’ crude oil inventories. For seasonality, we use monthly dummies given 
we are using monthly price data. For unexpected shocks, we define any observation that is three 
standard deviations away from the mean as an outlier (Barnett and Lewis, 1984) and give it a 
dummy. Last but not least, we use trends and AR(1) terms for all the input and gasoline prices.  
 Before applying the ordinary least square (OLS) analysis, we first identified outliers in 
the monthly gasoline prices (g). Table 3.1.1.1 shows all observations were within three standard 
deviations of the mean and no outliers were identified for unexpected shocks. 
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Table 3.1.1.1 Outlier Test of Gasoline Price 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
g 366 51.76477 35.52321 12.894 138.264 
 
 We then ran an OLS regression with all the variables, predicted monthly gasoline prices, 
and identified zero outlier in prediction errors (gd) with Table 3.1.1.2.  
Table 3.1.1.2 Outlier Test of Prediction Error of Gasoline Price 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
gd 189 -9.35e-08 3.178768 -7.801574 9.407989 
 
 Table 3.1.1.3 shows the regression results. We first focus on explaining the factors that 
do not affect gasoline price. As shown in Figure 3.1.1.1, refineries’ crude oil stock has little 
influence on the price of gasoline with its small weight in the total crude oil stock of the United 
States with and without Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Oil refineries often sign contracts for 
product delivery and buy delivery contracts of crude oil at certain dates and prices to hedge price 
risk. Due to the market’s competitive nature, refineries’ excessive oil stock is often limited 
compared to their monthly production level as shown in Figure 3.1.1.2. Thus, crude oil stocks is 
not an important explanatory variable. The prices of electricity and natural gas both have a 
negligible influence on gasoline prices mainly due to their limited use. By-products of oil 
refining supply most of the energy and refineries only use an amount of “natural gas and 
electricity with energy equivalent to 3% of the crude oil processed (Knittel and Smith, 2015).” 
Meanwhile, the price of crude oil, oil refineries’ idle capacities, monthly dummies, and a 
lagged dependent variable (the price of gasoline in the previous month) are significant variables 
that affect gasoline prices. As the major input, the price of crude oil directly impacts gasoline’s 
price. If an unexpected event, such as Hurricane Katrina, hits a region and decreases local 
refinery capacities, refineries elsewhere will be forced to supply the national market with more  
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Table 3.1.1.3 OLS Regression of Gasoline Price on Crude Oil Price 
 Gasoline Price 
crude oil 0.983*** 
(20.35) 
refineries’ crude oil stock 0.0000479 
(0.51) 
refineries’ idle capacity 0.00380*** 
(3.76) 
natural gas 0.344 
(0.76) 
electricity -0.605 
(-0.19) 
linear trend 0.141 
(1.34) 
quadratic trend -0.000170 
(-0.96) 
January 0.803 
(0.59) 
February 0.928 
(0.69) 
March 2.662 
(1.81) 
April 4.960** 
(3.26) 
May 3.946* 
(2.42) 
June 2.966 
(1.43) 
July 3.596 
(1.86) 
August 4.271* 
(2.40) 
September 3.305 
(1.97) 
October 0.842 
(0.52) 
November 0.452 
(0.31) 
crude oil previous month -0.585*** 
(-6.94) 
gasoline previous month 0.569*** 
(8.49) 
refineries’ crude oil stock 
previous month 
-0.0000933 
(-0.99) 
refineries’ idle capacity previous 
month 
-0.00283** 
(-2.70) 
natural gas previous month -0.0608 
(-0.14) 
electricity previous month -1.366 
(-0.45) 
constant -6.397 
(-0.36) 
Observations 189 
R-squared 0.9904 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9890 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 3.1.1.1 Refinery Stock as a Percentage of Total Stock with and without SPR  
Source: U.S. Total Stocks (Thousand Barrels), Monthly, EIA 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Ja
n-
20
05
M
ay
-2
00
5
Se
p-
20
05
Ja
n-
20
06
M
ay
-2
00
6
Se
p-
20
06
Ja
n-
20
07
M
ay
-2
00
7
Se
p-
20
07
Ja
n-
20
08
M
ay
-2
00
8
Se
p-
20
08
Ja
n-
20
09
M
ay
-2
00
9
Se
p-
20
09
Ja
n-
20
10
M
ay
-2
01
0
Se
p-
20
10
Ja
n-
20
11
M
ay
-2
01
1
Se
p-
20
11
Ja
n-
20
12
M
ay
-2
01
2
Se
p-
20
12
Ja
n-
20
13
M
ay
-2
01
3
Se
p-
20
13
Ja
n-
20
14
M
ay
-2
01
4
Se
p-
20
14
Ja
n-
20
15
M
ay
-2
01
5
Se
p-
20
15
Ja
n-
20
16
M
ay
-2
01
6
Se
p-
20
16
Refinery Crude Oil Stock as a Percentage of Total Stock with 
and without SPR 
Refinery Stock/Total Stock w/o SPR Refinery Stock/Total Stock w SPR
 26 
 
 
Figure 3.1.1.2 Refinery Crude Oil Stock and Net Production 
Source: Refinery Net Production (Thousand Barrels), Monthly, EIA 
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oil products ceteris paribus. The amount of excess capacity these unaffected plants owns will 
determine the extent of gasoline price increase. Monthly dummies overall match our previous 
prediction. Using December as the basis of comparison, gasoline prices in November, January, 
February, and March (the winter season) are not different from December’s value. Price picks up 
in April, continues to rise in May, and stays more or less the same except for an increase in 
August before it reaches a low in October. With the short interim period, gasoline prices in the 
last month will influence the value of the current month. 
We have not detected any shock that has disrupted the price link between crude oil and 
gasoline in the period of study.  While Hurricane Katrina and Rita caused serious damage after 
they landed in the southern part of the U.S., gasoline price in New England seems to remain 
largely unaffected. Political events appears not to cause major disruption to the crude oil market 
in the U.S. during the last decade. Besides refinery accidents, U.S. production level of crude oil 
took off near the end of 2010s, contributing towards greater level of energy security and 
independence (EIA, 2017). 
Overall, crude oil prices, seasonality, past prices, and supply and demand conditions are 
the significant variables that affect the link between gasoline and crude oil prices in the past ten 
years. 
3.1.2 The Link between Crude Oil and Diesel Prices  
The second model links crude oil (𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and diesel prices (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷). Similar to gasoline’s case, 
the same factors of production are assessed: inputs, seasonality, and unexpected shocks influence 
diesel prices. We also include trends and AR(1) terms to improve the model’s explanation 
power.  
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In Table 3.1.2.1, we first perform an outlier check of diesel prices (d) and no significant 
outliers are found.  
 
Table 3.1.2.1 Outlier Test of Diesel Price 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
d 126 99.95267 29.29784 41.118 163.254 
 
We then ran an OLS regression with all the variables in predicting monthly diesel prices. 
One outlier was identified in the prediction errors (dd). After giving the outlier a dummy, we ran 
the OLS regression again.  
Table 3.1.2.2 Outlier Test of Prediction Error of Diesel Price 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
dd 124 -1.07e-07 2.424837 -5.996594 9.811692 
 
Table 3.1.2.3 shows the results of the two regressions. After removing the outlier of the 
price shock (March 2008), the outcome is similar to that of the crude oil and gasoline price link. 
Crude oil prices, idle capacity, and a lagged dependent variable are significant variables affecting 
diesel prices. Refineries’ crude oil inventories and the prices of natural gas and electricity are not 
found to have significant impacts on the diesel price. Though the coefficient of the electricity 
price in the previous month is negative, technology advancement is unlikely to happen so fast 
such that refineries can use less electricity and reduce costs. As predicted, diesel sells at a 
premium during the harvesting season each year in October and the price increases again when 
winter begins in November.  
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Table 3.1.2.3 OLS Regression of Diesel Price on Crude Oil Price 
  (1) 
Diesel Price 
(2) 
Diesel Price 
crude oil 0.968*** 
(21.21) 
0.966*** 
(23.01) 
refineries’ crude oil stock 0.0000280 
(0.26) 
0.000000946 
(0.01) 
refineries’ idle capacity 0.00178 
(1.87) 
0.00198* 
(2.25) 
natural gas 1.188* 
(2.14) 
0.843 
(1.63) 
electricity 5.726 
(1.71) 
5.145 
(1.67) 
linear trend -0.109 
(-0.26) 
-0.236 
(-0.62) 
quadratic trend 0.000219 
(0.34) 
0.000418 
(0.70) 
January 2.122 
(1.42) 
2.250 
(1.63) 
February 2.415 
(1.71) 
2.576 
(1.98) 
March 2.233 
(1.35) 
1.110 
(0.72) 
April 2.473 
(1.52) 
2.517 
(1.68) 
May 1.193 
(0.69) 
1.421 
(0.89) 
June -0.350 
(-0.14) 
0.0203 
(0.01) 
July 0.800 
(0.30) 
0.766 
(0.31) 
August 4.278 
(1.57) 
3.812 
(1.52) 
September 4.092 
(1.64) 
3.386 
(1.47) 
October 5.683** 
(2.68) 
5.124* 
(2.62) 
November 4.371** 
(2.76) 
4.128** 
(2.83) 
crude oil previous month -0.691*** 
(-7.93) 
-0.714*** 
(-8.88) 
diesel previous month 0.750*** 
(11.13) 
0.772*** 
(12.41) 
refineries’ crude oil stock 
previous month 
-0.00000752 
(-0.07) 
-0.0000175 
(-0.18) 
idle capacity previous month -0.000513 
(-0.53) 
-0.000359 
(-0.40) 
natural gas previous month -0.669 
(-1.17) 
-0.553 
(-1.05) 
electricity previous month -7.393* 
(-2.25) 
-6.099* 
(-2.01) 
outliers of predicted diesel price  
 
11.89*** 
(4.34) 
Constant 18.00 
(0.34) 
37.83 
(0.78) 
Observations 124 124 
R-squared 0.9932 0.9943 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9915 0.9928 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 30 
 
3.1.3 Linking Crude Oil, Gasoline, and Diesel Prices through the Crack Spread 
 Analysts often use the term “crack spread” to obtain a rough estimate of refineries’ 
profits. The term refers to the price differential between processed oil products (outputs of 
gasoline and diesel) and crude oil (input). Some commonly used ratios include 3:2:1, 5:3:2, and 
2:1:1. For example, a 3:2:1 spread means every three barrels of crude oil would yield two barrels  
of gasoline and one barrel of diesel. By taking the price difference between the sum of gasoline 
and diesel and crude oil, analysts will have some idea about the refineries’ profits. 
In reality, the calculated crack spread also contains the component of processing costs of 
refineries on top of profits. Equation 3.1.3.1 shows the relationship among the three products, 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  is the crack spread per barrel, 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 is the gasoline price per barrel, 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 is the diesel 
price per barrel, and 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  is the crude oil price per barrel in time period t. 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 23 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 13 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 −  𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡                        (3.1.3.1) 
The main purpose for examining the crack spread is to see whether the implementation of 
the blend mandate has brought any change to the trend of the crack spread. Figure 3.1.3.1 shows 
the history of the crack spread.  Due to data availability, however, we have no information of the 
spread before the implementation of the blend mandate. Since 2006, the crack spread has been 
rather unstable, being the lowest between 2009 and 2011 while fluctuating significantly between 
2006 and 2008 and in 2013.  
As the crack spread is a derived value, prices and quantities (such as inventories and idle 
capacities) of oil and oil products cannot serve as independent variables in the regression model 
(3.1.3.2) due to the multicollinearity issue. Thus, besides the variables of seasonality and 
unexpected shocks, we use a trend and AR(1) terms in the model of Equation 3.1.3.2. 
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𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐,𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 ,𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖)   
(3.1.3.2) 
We first examine if there is any outlier in 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  (cs) and no outlier is found as shown in 
Table 3.1.3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1.3.1 Outlier Test of the Crack Spread 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
cs 126 12.6701 3.870704 6.172 24.266 
 
We ran an OLS regression with all the variables to predict monthly crack spreads, and 
identified two outliers in the prediction errors (csd) in Table 3.1.3.2. After giving each a dummy, 
we ran the OLS regression again and Table 3.1.3.3 shows the results of the two regressions. 
Table 3.1.3.2 Outlier Test of the Crack Spread Prediction Error 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
csd 125 3.07e-09 2.624792 -6.330684 10.69226 
 
Ignoring the outliers, seasonality has a stronger impact on crack spread than the lagged 
term. Using December as the basis of comparison, crack spreads are higher in late spring and 
early summer. Factors such as plant maintenance in the spring and higher gasoline price in the 
summer during the travel season may have contributed to this seasonal premium.  
 Other than that, the limited explanation power of the model and the variations in the 
crack spread do not provide much more additional information on how gasoline and diesel prices 
interact with each other.  
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Figure 3.1.3.1 3:2:1 Crack Spread 
 
Source: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline Regular Spot Price FOB/Ultra-Low Sulfur No 2 
Diesel Spot Price, Monthly, EIA
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Table 3.1.3.3 OLS Regression of the Crack Spread 
 (1) (2) 
 Crack Spread Crack Spread 
linear trend 0.00877 
(1.26) 
0.0109 
(1.83) 
January 1.817 
(1.46) 
1.784 
(1.68) 
February 2.088 
(1.68) 
2.076 
(1.96) 
March 2.145 
(1.73) 
2.154* 
(2.03) 
April 3.669** 
(2.95) 
3.694*** 
(3.48) 
May 2.865* 
(2.27) 
2.936** 
(2.72) 
June 1.676 
(1.32) 
1.758 
(1.62) 
July 1.305 
(1.06) 
1.387 
(1.31) 
August 2.031 
(1.66) 
2.083* 
(1.99) 
September 1.952 
(1.60) 
-0.191 
(-0.17) 
October 0.802 
(0.66) 
0.848 
(0.81) 
November 1.043 
(0.86) 
1.058 
(1.02) 
crack spread last month 0.661*** 
(9.33) 
0.636*** 
(10.49) 
outlier of predicted 
crack spread 
 
 
12.06*** 
(6.49) 
constant -0.164 
(-0.07) 
-0.538 
(-0.27) 
Observations 125 125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4808 0.6213 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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3.2 The Link between Energy and Biofuel Prices 
 Depending on which biofuel policy regime (tax credit or mandate premium) explained in 
Chapter 2 is binding, biofuels can either be complements or substitutes for oil products. When 
the mandate is binding, biofuels are complements with their energy product counterparts. The 
ban of MTBE in the early 2000s and the enforcement of the 2005 and 2007 RFS blending 
mandate have stimulated a sharp increase in the production of both ethanol and biodiesel. The 
majority of gasoline sold at pumps today uses ethanol as an oxygenate and carries roughly 10 
percent of fuel ethanol (hitting the blend wall where regular cars cannot consume fuel with more 
than 10 percent ethanol). Similarly, retail diesel is often a mixture of regular diesel and biodiesel 
based on different blend specifications. Meanwhile, when the tax credit is binding (no mandate 
premiums), ethanol and biodiesel are substitutes for energy and both prices hit the minimum 
price floor. Moreover, ethanol is also a close substitute to conventional gasoline when used in 
flex-fuel vehicles. We use the above two policy regimes for empirical analysis of the energy and 
biofuel price links. 
3.2.1 The Link between Ethanol and Gasoline Prices 
 Since 2006, the interaction between the prices of gasoline (𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁) and ethanol (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 ) has 
become dependent on the two regimes discussed above (henceforth referred to as “two states of 
nature”). Each year, consumers demand a certain amount of ethanol for purposes like oxygenate 
or fuel in the absence of a blend mandate and tax credits. However, as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) started to require the blending of ethanol into retail gasoline with the 
RFS in 2005, consumers now must consume a certain amount of ethanol with their purchase of 
retail gasoline every year even if they would not have done so otherwise. The yearly target 
amount of ethanol changes over time as EPA converts a volumetric (a fixed volume target each 
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year) and with a fractional (a fixed percentage target) mandates. Moreover, to encourage the 
production of ethanol, government has provided a tax credit for producers in the first few years. 
These policy interventions have led to the existence of two states of nature. 
 The relationship between the prices of gasoline and ethanol depends on which regime is 
binding. A blend mandate requires consumers to use more ethanol than they would otherwise 
and consumers will have to pay for a higher 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  as shown in Chapter 2. When consumers demand 
more ethanol than EPA’s annual requirement, we say the tax credit regime is binding and 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  are locked onto each other as fuel substitutes. The equation below describes the pair’s 
relationship under the two regimes. The variable representing the ethanol price 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  is supposed to 
be the lowest under the tax credit regime. 
The price relationship under a blend mandate regime is given by Equation 3.2.1.1, where 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 refers to fuel (the mixture of ethanol and gasoline) price and α represents the fraction of 
ethanol required in the total fuel mix. 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 + (1− 𝛼𝛼)𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁                         (3.2.1.1) 
The price relationship under a tax credit regime is given by Equation 3.2.1.2, where 𝜆𝜆 = 
0.70 refers to the amount of miles a gallon of ethanol achieves compared to a gallon of regular 
gasoline (de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 2015). The volumetric fuel tax is represented by t and 𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁 is 
government’s tax credit for fuel blenders. 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸
∗ = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 − (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑖𝑖 + 𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁                       (3.2.1.2) 
 Keeping in mind the implication of the two different regimes, we now examine the 
relationship between ethanol and gasoline prices. For a given gasoline price, we first predict the 
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ethanol price 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸∗ using Equation 3.2.1.2 and then take the difference between 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸∗ to derive 
the term we call the mandate price premium. In theory, when the mandate price premium is high, 
the blend mandate regime should be binding and consumers will have to pay for a higher ethanol 
price. As the ethanol price under such circumstance does not reflect its real value as a fuel, 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  
and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  become delinked. Alternatively, if the mandate premium is low, 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  should be 
closely linked under the tax credit regime. 
 Table 3.2.1.1 shows the result of our test of the above hypothesis with the correlation 
between 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 . In theory, the correlation is expected to be low, if not negative, when the 
mandate premium is high, but positive and high when the tax credit is binding. Mandate 
premium are the lowest when we only include the observations below the first quartile (bottom 
25% of the values), and the correlation we get is 0.8613. Similarly, mandate premium is the 
highest when we only include the observations above the third quartile (top 25% of the values), 
and the correlation we get is 0.9099. This does not match with our prediction. Moreover, as we 
continue to drop observations of smaller values of mandate premium across quartiles to obtain 
correlations, the values increase instead of decrease.  
Table 3.2.1.1 Correlations between Gasoline and Ethanol Prices  
Mandate Premium No. of Observations Correlation 
Full Sample 123 0.8162 
Observations below the First Quartile 31 0.8613 
Observations above the First Quartile 92 0.8439 
Observations above the Median 62 0.8617 
Observations above the Second Quartile 61 0.8593 
Observations above the Third Quartile 30 0.9099 
  
To study this same link, we also examine the relationship between the percentage 
changes in 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (%Δ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and %Δ𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 ) from the previous month by taking their differences. In 
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theory, under the tax credit regime, %Δ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and %Δ𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  should move in the same direction (either 
increase or decrease) if no shocks affect the crude oil and gasoline price link and the difference 
between their magnitudes should be small in a certain period. Alternatively, under the blend 
mandate regime, %Δ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and %Δ𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  should go in opposite directions (unless exogenous shocks 
induce a drop in supply in gasoline, forcing 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  to go up) with the relationship in Equation 3.2.1.1 
and the difference between their magnitudes should be large most of the time in a certain period.  
Following this reasoning, we divide the data into three groups and check their 
correlations individually. The first group of data reflects the situation when the tax credit regime 
is binding. After keeping the observations whose %Δ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and %Δ𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  move in the same direction 
(either increasing or decreasing), we use the sample mean of the absolute values of the difference 
between %Δ in 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  as a reference. If the absolute value is smaller than the sample mean, 
we keep it. Otherwise, we drop it. The second group of data captures the condition when the 
blend mandate regime is binding. After keeping the observations whose %Δ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and %Δ𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  move 
in the opposite directions, we use the sample mean of the absolute values of the difference 
between %Δ in 𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁  and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  as a reference. If the absolute value is bigger than the sample mean, 
we keep it. Otherwise, we drop it. The third group of data consists observations that do not 
belong to the first two groups. 
We have mixed results from Table 3.2.1.2. At one hand, when the prices of ethanol and 
gasoline move together under the tax credit regime, the removal of observations above sample 
mean should yield higher correlation values but does not. Meanwhile, in those months when 
gasoline and ethanol prices move in different directions, the correlation between the two 
variables falls, as predicted, when we select the sample above the mean value.  
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Table 3.2.1.2 Correlations between Percentage Change in Ethanol and Gasoline Prices  |%Δ𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 − %Δ𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁| Group No. of Observations Correlation 
Full Sample 1 72 0.8184 
Sample of Observations 
below Sample Mean 
1 47 0.8005 
Full Sample 2 52 0.8190 
Sample of Observations 
above Sample Mean 
2 20 0.7307 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2.1.1, ethanol and gasoline prices do not always track each other. 
Notably, the prices moved in different directions in late 2006 to early 2007, mid-2009, 2010, and 
late 2011 through the first quarter of 2014. Meanwhile, Figure 3.2.1.2 shows us the predicted 
ethanol price under the tax credit binding regime also tracks the overall price trend poorly in 
some of these periods while it generally follows the actual price in other periods. During the 
periods of ethanol and gasoline prices tend to diverge, actual ethanol price did not always lie 
above the theoretical price floor, such as in mid-2009 and early 2010, but otherwise 
corresponded to positive mandate premiums most of the time. This result seems to confirm our 
model’s validity as we incorporate other factors, such as ethanol production capacity over years, 
to account for unexplained anomalies.  
Figure 3.2.1.3 shows how U.S. ethanol production has leveled off since 2006. For the 
period from 2011 onward, predicted ethanol prices have been consistently lower than the actual 
ethanol prices. Meanwhile, as ethanol production capacity continued to increase between 2006 
and 2010, there were periods in which the actual market prices were lower than the predicted 
prices. Such occurrences in the early years signaled an over-supply of ethanol in the market and 
one possible reason was that retailers and consumers were not able to handle the fast increase in 
ethanol consumption requirement due to the existence of the blend wall.  For retailers, oil 
companies may not be able to help them upgrade the pumps, transport tools, and storage  
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Figure 3.2.1.1 New York Harbor Gasoline and Iowa Ethanol Prices 
Source: New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline Regular Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Gallon), Monthly, EIA 
Ethanol Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU
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Figure 3.2.1.2 Iowa Actual and Predicted Ethanol Price and Mandate Premium 
Source: Ethanol Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Figure 3.2.1.3 Iowa Actual and Predicted Ethanol Price and U.S. Ethanol Production Capacity 
Source: Ethanol Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
Ethanol Production Capacity by Plant, Nebraska Government 
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facilities for the mixed fuel fast enough; and for consumers, their car engines may not be able to 
handle a fuel with more than 10 percent ethanol without incurring any damage. Other reasons for 
the actual price being lower than the predicted price may include import of foreign ethanol in the 
short term to meet an annual blend goal.  
We use Model 3.2.1.1 to study the mandate premium. The tax credit dummy is 1 if the 
government offers a blender’s tax credit. For the mandate premium dummy, it is 1 if the mandate 
premium falls below 0.  
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐, 
𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐,𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁−1, 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖)    (3.2.1.1) 
  
We examine if there is any outlier in the mandate premium and Table 3.2.1.3 reports 
there is no outlier.  
Table 3.2.1.3 Outlier Test of the Mandate Premium 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
mp_NY 123 0.2880204 0.2992867 -0.4705 0.9155905 
 
We then run an OLS regression with all the variables to predict the mandate premium, 
and identified one outlier in the prediction errors (mpdd) in Table 3.2.1.4. After giving it a 
dummy, we ran the OLS regression again and Table 3.2.1.5 shows the results of the two 
regressions. 
Table 3.2.1.4 Outlier Test of the Mandate Premium Prediction Error 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
mpdd 122 -1.29e-09 0.1381056 -0.3239646 0.5737674 
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Table 3.2.1.5 OLS Regression of the Ethanol Mandate Premium 
 (1) (2) 
 Mandate Premium Mandate Premium 
linear trend -0.000972 
(-0.57) 
-0.00107 
(-0.68) 
quadratic trend 0.0000160 
(1.26) 
0.0000165 
(1.41) 
January -0.0896 
(-1.37) 
-0.0877 
(-1.46) 
February -0.147* 
(-2.26) 
-0.144* 
(-2.41) 
March -0.0356 
(-0.54) 
-0.0945 
(-1.52) 
April -0.0824 
(-1.26) 
-0.0787 
(-1.31) 
May -0.0691 
(-1.05) 
-0.0647 
(-1.07) 
June -0.0477 
(-0.72) 
-0.0423 
(-0.69) 
July -0.0791 
(-1.19) 
-0.0723 
(-1.18) 
August -0.0475 
(-0.72) 
-0.0429 
(-0.71) 
September -0.0575 
(-0.87) 
-0.0534 
(-0.87) 
October -0.0889 
(-1.33) 
-0.0813 
(-1.32) 
November 0.0791 
(1.23) 
0.0841 
(1.42) 
tax credit dummy -0.0452 
(-0.80) 
-0.0293 
(-0.57) 
mandate premium 
dummy 
-0.280*** 
(-5.86) 
-0.272*** 
(-6.20) 
mandate premium in the 
previous month 
0.473*** 
(6.75) 
0.502*** 
(7.75) 
mandate premium 
outlier dummy 
 
 
0.651*** 
(4.48) 
constant 0.255* 
(2.57) 
0.237* 
(2.59) 
Observations 122 122 
R-squared 0.7881 0.8224 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7558 0.7934 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Among the variables, only the mandate premium dummy, the lagged dependent variable 
(the mandate premium in the previous month), and the outlier dummy are significant factors. A 
joint F-test of the monthly dummies reports we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all of the 
monthly dummy variables are zero. As a calculated value based on ethanol and gasoline prices, 
this lack of seasonal change in the mandate premium may hint the two prices have already 
included the seasonal change component of the mandate premium. As a result, this does not 
seem to cast more light onto the ethanol and gasoline price link. 
3.2.2 The Link between Biodiesel and Diesel Prices 
 Similarly, the U.S. blend mandate and tax credit programs for biodiesel affect the price 
relationship between biodiesel and diesel. The two states of nature described above still hold. 
The relationship between the price of biodiesel (𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷) and diesel (𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷) also depends on 
which regime is binding. When a blend mandate requires consumers to use more biodiesel than 
they otherwise would in a free market, the blend mandate regime is binding and consumers will 
have to pay a higher price for biodiesel than the free market price. Under this regime, the price of 
fuel is a mixed average (Equation 3.2.2.1), where  𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 refers to fuel (the mixture of biodiesel and 
diesel) price. The parameter α represents the fraction of biodiesel in a fixed volume of fuel. The 
price of biodiesel 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 will go down if the price of diesel 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷  goes up and vice versa. 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹 = 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷            (3.2.2.1) 
When consumers demand more biodiesel than EPA’s annual requirement, the tax credit  
regime is expected to be binding as 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷  are locked onto each other as fuel substitutes. 
Equation 3.2.2.2 models the minimum price of biodiesel when it competes with diesel as a 
substitute, where 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 is the diesel fuel tax and 𝜆𝜆 (=0.913) refers to the fractional mileage a gallon 
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of biodiesel can obtain compared to a gallon of diesel. With a positive blender’s tax credit (𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸), 
the lowest biodiesel prices can go is given by Equation 3.2.2.2’. 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷
∗  = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 − (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑            (3.2.2.2) 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷
∗  = 𝜆𝜆𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 − (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸              (3.2.2.2’) 
 Under the framework of these two regimes, we now examine the relationship between the 
diesel price 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷  and the biodiesel price 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷. We first predict the lowest biodiesel prices can go 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷
∗  using Equation 3.2.2.2’, and then take the difference between 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷∗  to derive the 
mandate premium. In theory, when the mandate premium is high, the blend mandate regime is 
binding and consumers will have to pay a higher biodiesel price. As the biodiesel price under 
such circumstance does not reflect its real value as a fuel, 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷  become delinked. 
Alternatively, if the mandate premium is low, 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷  is closely linked under the tax credit 
regime. 
Unlike ethanol price that switches between the two regimes, the blend mandate regime 
appears binding for biodiesel price most of the time throughout our data range as shown in 
Figures 3.2.2.1 (except briefly in 2014). Contrary to the relationship between ethanol and 
gasoline, Figure 3.2.2.2 shows biodiesel price has been consistently higher than the price of 
diesel throughout the data period despite its lower energy content. Under this circumstance, we 
test the hypothesis of the correlation between 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷 and 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷  will go down as the mandate premium 
goes up and Table 3.2.2.1 shows the results. The correlations between the two variables switch 
back and forth as the mandate premium increases and we cannot arrive at a conclusion about our 
theory’s prediction. 
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Table 3.2.2.1 Correlations between Biodiesel and Diesel Prices  
Mandate Premium No. of Observations Correlation 
Full Sample 117 0.8402 
Observations above the First Quartile 87 0.9039 
Observations above the Median 58 0.8850 
Observations above the Second 
Quartile 
57 0.8850 
Observations above the Third Quartile 29 0.8955 
 
Alternatively, we examine the trends of percentage change in prices of the two fuels. 
Under the mandate binding regime, we would predict percentage change in the prices of 
biodiesel and diesel would travel in opposite directions. However, as shown in Figure 3.2.2.3, the 
general trends of the two variables actually walk together most of the time except briefly in Q1 
of 2010, Q4 of 2011, Q4 of 2012, Q2 of 2013, and Q4 of 2016. There are many possible causes 
for the divergence. For example, if a group of major refinery plants undergoes prolonged period 
of maintenance in the spring, diesel price will go up with reduced overall production and 
biodiesel may be forced to be sold at a lower price with its normal production level due to the 
shortage in diesel supply for blending. Alternatively, if there is an exchange rate crisis with a 
trade partner’s currency, U.S. may acquire less biofuels through import to meet its annual RFS 
blend goal, putting more pressure on domestic biodiesel producers and driving up biodiesel 
price. Meanwhile, if it is a busy summer driving season and more gasoline is produced by 
refineries than diesel from a barrel of oil due to the price premium, diesel price can be low. This 
is what explains the divergence in price change trends in 2011 and 2013. Though domestic 
biodiesel plants had excess capacities, the blend mandate’s structure of RFS prevented the 
producers from capturing the excess profit in the market as import of Brazilian ethanol fell due to  
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Figure 3.2.2.1 Actual and Predicted Biodiesel Price and Mandate Premium 
Source: Biodiesel Price, Historical Biodiesel Operating Margins, CARD, ISU
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Figure 3.2.2.2 Diesel and Biodiesel Prices and Price Difference 
Source: Biodiesel Price, Historical Biodiesel Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
New York Harbor Ultra-Low Sulfur No 2 Diesel Spot Price (Dollars per Gallon), Monthly, EIA
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Figure 3.2.2.3 Percentage Change in Diesel and Biodiesel Prices 
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exchange rate jump and domestically produced biodiesel was called upon to fill the gap (de 
Gorter, Drabik, and Just, 2015). 
The limitation of trying to use the reduced form model in Equation 3.2.2.2’ to study the 
interaction between biodiesel and diesel prices is that it is not as robust and effective as a large 
structural model, which could handle controlling of other factors more effectively. However, this 
simple model has its own merit in showing us the different possible causes for the divergence in 
the two prices within the framework of the two states of nature. 
3.3 The Link between Crops and Biofuels Prices 
 The beginning of the biofuel era has directly affected crop production in the United 
States. As the primary feedstock of ethanol, plants has been using 35 to 40 percent of the corn 
crop every year recently (USDA, 2016). Grains and oilseeds, particularly corn and soybean, 
make up the bulk of crop values in the four states of large crop sales (Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, 
and Nebraska) (USDA, 2016). As showed in Figure 3.3.0.1, soybean production has also picked 
up with the hike in corn output. The newly created crop and biofuel price links become ever 
important.  
3.3.1 The Link between Corn and Ethanol Prices 
 Corn has long been used for both human consumption and animal feed and the beginning 
of the US biofuel era in 2006 added extra value to the crop. As the main feedstock for ethanol, 
corn yields the co-product distiller's dried grains with soluble (DDGS), a common animal feed, 
and facilities could process DDGS further to obtain corn oil suitable for both human 
consumption and biodiesel with investment in production facilities. Based upon these facts and 
current technology, we model the corn and ethanol price links in Equation 3.3.1.1. 
 51 
 
 
Figure 3.3.0.1 U.S. Major Corp Products Acreage Information
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𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶
∗ =  𝛽𝛽
1−𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟
∗ (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸 − 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺) + 𝜃𝜃1−𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟  ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  (3.3.1.1) 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶
∗ is the predicted price of a bushel of corn given the prices of 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸  (ethanol price per 
gallon), 𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺 (ethanol production cost per gallon), and 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  (corn oil price per pound). 𝛽𝛽, which 
equals 2.8, is the gallons of ethanol per bushel of corn yields. r is the relative price of DDGs and 
corn. 𝛾𝛾 is the bushel of DDGS obtained after the crush and has the value of 0.304. And 𝜃𝜃 is the 
pounds of corn oil obtained from a bushel of corn, which usually equals 0.5. de Gorter, Drabik, 
and Just provided all the technical coefficients (2015).   
Equation 3.3.1.1 assumes a zero profit condition (though we recognize the ethanol market 
was not mature in its early years). In a perfectly competitive market, an ethanol producer will 
monitor its production such that the revenue it earns from producing the last unit of output 
should equal to the unit’s cost. Under this assumption, an over-prediction of corn price would 
mean an ethanol producer will benefit from the lower actual corn price, earning positive profit. 
On the other hand, if the predicted price is lower than the actual price, ethanol producers will 
earn negative profit.   
 Though either positive or negative profits may seem abnormal once a market matures, 
there are different possible reasons for their occurrences. During the early years of the mass 
production of biofuel, producers might face capacity constraints as they continued to expand 
their operation to capture economies of size. Within this scenario, producers use less corn than 
the optimal level and enjoy positive profit on the last sold unit and corn price would not be bid 
up. Meanwhile, though less likely, the gasoline supply chain might also need time to adjust their 
marketing channels to accommodate the sudden influx of large amount of fuel ethanol, causing 
their profit to deviate from the normal level.  
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 However, such positive or negative profit periods should be transient. When facing 
positive profit on the last unit, producers will attempt to capture more profit with production 
expansion. When facing negative profit, producers, in theory, will keep the facilities running to 
cover the variable cost but eventually will shut down if they keep losing money.  
 Figure 3.3.1.1 shows the actual and predicted corn prices together with prediction errors 
based on the model. Overall, the predicted corn prices have not been lower than the actual corn 
price, meaning ethanol producers made positive profits, except in late 2008 to mid-2009, the first 
half of 2012, late 2012 to the first quarter of 2013 and  late 2015 to the first quarter of 2016. 
Meanwhile, predicted corn price has been consistently higher than the actual corn price between 
2006 and 2008, the last quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2010, August 2010 to the end of 
2011, February 2013 and January 2015, and April 2016 till the year’s end. 
We investigate ethanol producers’ profits, the differences between the actual corn prices 
and the predicted corn prices (3.3.1.1) with Model 3.3.1.1.  For all profit below 0 (meaning the 
actual corn price is lower than the predicted corn price), the profit dummy will be 1. 
𝛱𝛱𝑁𝑁 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐,𝛱𝛱𝑁𝑁−1, 
𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖)                           (3.3.1.1) 
 
We first examine the profit. Table 3.3.1.1 shows there are two outliers whose values are 
three standard deviations away from the mean. The two observations occurred in March and 
April of 2014. 
Table 3.3.1.1 Outliers of the Ethanol Plant Profit 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
pe_corn 120 0.6337337 1.066621 -0.8643347 5.499552 
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Figure 3.3.1.1 Actual and Predicted Corn Prices and Prediction Errors 
Source: Corn Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU
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After dropping the two observations, we run an OLS regression to predict the profit 
margin and try to detect any outlier again based on the prediction errors. We detect two more 
outliers and give them both a dummy and run the regression again. The results of both 
regressions are shown in Table 3.3.1.3.  
Table 3.3.1.2 Outliers of the Ethanol Plant Profit Prediction Error 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
pe_corn_d 117 -7.52e-10 0.4599968 -1.025543 1.720166 
 
 The results we get are similar to the ethanol and gasoline model. An F test of the joint 
significance of the monthly dummies shows we cannot reject the null hypothesis of all the 
monthly dummy coefficients are zero. The lagged profit term from the previous month, the profit 
dummy, and the prediction error outliers are all significant in this case.  
3.3.2 The Link between Soybean and Biodiesel Prices 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, despite biodiesel production sources from various feedstocks, 
soybean oil is the most common input for biodiesel manufacturing in the U.S. We will use 
soybean to complete our analysis of the crop and biofuel price links. 
The price relationships between corn and ethanol and soybean oil and biodiesel differ. 
The processing of corn yields ethanol, DDGS, and corn oil. DDGS is an important animal feed 
and ethanol producers return it to the market almost as a corn equivalent. With this fact, ethanol 
production increase causes minimal change in the supply of corn, and we call DDGs a co-
product of corn processing. Unlike corn or DDGs, farmers do not usually feed soybean to 
animals directly due to soybean storage problem and animal health concern (Lane, 2000). 
Instead, soybean processors often crush soybean to obtain soybean oil and soybean meal, the   
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Table 3.3.1.3 Regression of Ethanol Producer Profits 
 (1) (2) 
 Producer Profit Producer Profit 
linear trend 0.00325 
(0.58) 
-0.00102 
(-0.21) 
quadratic trend -0.0000256 
(-0.58) 
0.00000303 
(0.08) 
January -0.375 
(-1.65) 
-0.199 
(-0.99) 
February -0.155 
(-0.69) 
-0.00853 
(-0.04) 
March 0.121 
(0.51) 
0.247 
(1.20) 
April 0.133 
(0.57) 
0.279 
(1.35) 
May -0.0210 
(-0.09) 
0.160 
(0.82) 
June -0.331 
(-1.46) 
-0.148 
(-0.74) 
July 0.195 
(0.87) 
0.363 
(1.83) 
August -0.184 
(-0.81) 
0.00151 
(0.01) 
September -0.0878 
(-0.39) 
-0.0973 
(-0.50) 
October -0.175 
(-0.78) 
0.00361 
(0.02) 
November 0.415 
(1.83) 
0.591** 
(2.96) 
prediction error negative 
dummy 
-0.788*** 
(-6.02) 
-0.752*** 
(-6.58) 
prediction error of the 
previous month 
0.497*** 
(8.29) 
0.461*** 
(8.75) 
prediction error outlier 
dummy 
 
 
1.886*** 
(5.75) 
constant 0.477* 
(2.05) 
0.436* 
(2.15) 
Observations 117 117 
R-squared 0.7337  
Adjusted R-squared 0.6941  
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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latter an important feed. Within this process, soybean meal is not returned to the market as a 
soybean equivalent. The production of more biodiesel from soybean oil leads to the crushing of 
more soybean, and the supply of soybean meal in the market will increase, driving down soybean 
meal price if demand remains unchanged. For this reason, we call soybean meal a joint product 
of soybean crushing. 
Based upon the main usage of soybean besides human consumption, our model describes 
the soybean (𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵) and biodiesel (𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵) price links in the following two equations, where 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵  refers 
to the price of a bushel of soybean. 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
∗ =  𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 − 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐶0𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠   (3.3.2.1)  
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
∗ =  𝛽𝛽3 ∗ (𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 −  𝐶𝐶0𝑠𝑠) (3.3.2.2) 
According to de Gorter, Drabik, and Just, every bushel (60 pounds) of soybean yields 
11.28 pounds (𝛽𝛽1) of soybean oil and 48.72 pounds (𝛽𝛽2) of soybean meal after crushing (2015). 
One pound of non-consumable soybean oil yields 0.13 gallons (𝛽𝛽3) of biodiesel. 𝐶𝐶0𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  is the 
processing cost of one pound of soybean oil and 𝐶𝐶0𝑠𝑠  is the processing cost of a gallon of 
biodiesel. For both variables, we assume soybean and biodiesel processers operate under 
constant return to scale and their values are fixed. Lastly, 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  and 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆  each denotes the prices of 
one pound of soybean oil and one pound of soybean meal. 
We first show the trends of biodiesel, soybean oil, and soybean prices in Figure 
3.3.2.1a/b/c to illustrate the necessity of using two equations to model the relationships. Unlike 
the tight price link between ethanol and corn, the price of biodiesel is not closely linked to 
soybean price due to the intermediate channel of soybean oil. Biodiesel and soybean oil prices 
track each other most of the time in Figure 3.3.2.1a except in 2011 and the price trends of 
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soybean oil and soybean are similar in Figure 3.3.2.1b except in 2009, 2010, and 2016. However, 
biodiesel and soybean prices mostly walked in opposite directions between 2009 and 2012 and 
between 2014 and 2015 in Figure 3.3.2.1c. Thus, the price link between soybean and biodiesel 
appears indirect and the two prices do not always move together.  
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵
∗ =  𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆    (3.3.2.1’) 
Although we do not have enough information about 𝐶𝐶0𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  from Equation 3.3.2.1, we can 
use Equation 3.3.2.1’ to test the prediction power of our model under the assumption of 
processing costs with constant returns to scale. While QUALISOY, a soybean industry source, 
reports soybean crushing plants’ average total cost and variable cost to be between 60 to 70 cents 
and 30 cents per bushel respectively in May, 2016, we do not have monthly processing cost data 
between 2007 and 2016 (Galloway, 2016). However, Figure 3.3.2.2 shows the predicted soybean 
price tracks soybean price almost perfectly in the absence of the information of actual processing 
costs.  
Moreover, using Equation 3.3.2.2, we obtain the predicted prices of soybean oil and 
Figure 3.3.2.3 shows the equation models the link between the two prices well except in 2011, 
2013, and 2016. During these three years, the positive prediction errors mean biodiesel producers 
earn positive profit in the last unit produced. According to de Gorter, Drabik, and Just (2015), 
there was excess capacity in biodiesel production in the U.S. in 2011 and 2013. However, the 
nested US blend mandate prevented the plants from increasing their productions fast enough to 
eliminate the excess profit. Meanwhile, the unexpected increase in the biodiesel mandate in 
November, 2015 caused the excess profits of biodiesel producers in 2016. 
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Figure 3.3.2.1a Biodiesel and Soybean Oil Price History 
Source:  Biodiesel Price, Historical Biodiesel Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
Soybean Oil Price, Biodiesel Weekly, CARD, ISU
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Figure 3.3.2.1b Soybean and Soybean Oil Price History 
Source: Soybeans, Number 1 Yellow USD / Bushel; USDA, Daily, Datastream 
Soybean Oil Price, Biodiesel Weekly, CARD, ISU
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Figure 3.3.2.1c Biodiesel and Soybean Price History 
Source: Soybeans, Number 1 Yellow USD / Bushel; USDA, Daily, Datastream 
Biodiesel Price, Historical Biodiesel Operating Margins, CARD, ISU
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Figure 3.3.2.2 Predicted Soybean Price without Processing Cost and Actual Prices  
Source: Soybeans, Number 1 Yellow USD / Bushel; USDA, Daily, Datastream 
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Figure 3.3.2.3 Actual and Predicted Soybean Oil Prices and Prediction Errors 
Source: Soybean Oil Price, Biodiesel Weekly, CARD, ISU
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In Chapter 3, we have constructed empirical models using the economic theories of the 
two states of nature from Chapter 2 to examine the price links between energy and crop 
commodities. We have found many factors that could explain the delinking of any price pairs. In 
Chapter 4, we will discuss using these relationships in simulations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SIMULATIONS OF ENERGY AND CROP PRICE LINKS 
 Building upon the economic theories and empirical models in previous chapters, we now 
explore how changes in policies and markets could influence commodity prices through energy 
and crop price links. We examine three scenarios in the following order: (1) what if the price of a 
barrel of crude oil stayed at $110 beginning January, 2008; (2) what if biofuel blenders’ tax 
credit did not exist from the beginning; and (3) what if biofuel blenders’ tax credit continued to 
exist throughout the data period. 
4.1 When Crude Oil Price Increases 
 The energy and crop price links begin with crude oil. According to EIA, crude oil 
provided for 36 percent of U.S. total energy consumption in 2015 while the second major source 
natural gas contributed 29 percent (2017). The increase in the price of the major energy source 
since the early 2000s concerned policy makers as the RFS came into place in the mid-2000s. By 
the beginning of 2007, oil price was almost 60 dollars per barrel, compared to the average price 
in the 20s of early 2000s, and the price increase continued, reaching the maximum of 132.72 per 
barrel in July 2008 (Brent free-on-board spot crude oil price) before leveling off . However, the 
price hike came back again in 2011 and crude oil price maintained its level above 100 dollars per 
barrel for the next three years. 
 As shown in Figure 4.0.1, though crude oil price began its new round of increase in early 
2007, 2008 was an important year with the sharp price increase within a few months. Thus, it 
would be of interest if we can simulate the scenario of crude oil price stayed at 110 per barrel 
(the average price in the first six months of 2008) for the next few years and examine its impact  
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Figure 4.0.1 Monthly Brent Free-on-Board Spot Crude Oil Price (USD/Barrel) 
Source: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel), Monthly, EIA 
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on other commodity prices.  
4.1.1 Crude Oil Price Increases and Corn Prices 
To achieve this goal, we first predict the gasoline price beginning January, 2008 using 
Model 3.1.0.1, and then use the predicted gasoline price to calculate the predicted ethanol price 
using Equation 3.2.1.2. Lastly, we find the minimum corn price using Equation 3.3.1.1 based on 
the predicted ethanol price.  
 As shown in Figure 4.1.1.1, the simulated crude oil price is higher than its historical 
value except in May-August 2008, March-September 2011, November 2011, January-May 2012, 
August-October 2012, January-February 2013, August-September 2013, December 2013, and 
June 2014 (26 out of 95 months). In Figure 4.1.1.2, the price difference between simulated and 
historical gasoline prices follows the price difference trend in Figure 4.1.1.1 but otherwise differs 
in 11 months such that simulated gasoline price was higher than historical price even if the 
simulated crude oil price in that month was lower than the actual value. However, a closer look 
reveals only one of the 11 months (November 2011) has a price difference with an absolute value 
that is more than 5% of the average value of the simulated and historical gasoline prices. As 
prediction error can still occur despite the gasoline price model in Model 3.1.0.1 has an adjusted 
R-squared value of 0.9890, we can consider the price difference outlier to be the result of 
prediction errors when we cannot find an explanation from events in 2011. And, this single 
outlier will not disrupt the overall price pattern of the simulated gasoline price. 
 Figure 4.1.1.3 shows the predicted and historical ethanol prices. Compared to Figure 
3.2.2.2, the predicted ethanol price is (by construction) overall higher than the historical ethanol 
price. As a result, the predicted ethanol price when crude oil stays at 110 dollars per barrel no 
longer tracks the trend of real ethanol price as well compared to its historical counterpart. 
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Figure 4.1.1.1 Historical Crude Oil and Simulated Crude Oil Price (USD/Barrel) 
Source: Europe Brent Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Barrel), Monthly, EIA   
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Figure 4.1.1.2 Historical Gasoline and Simulated Gasoline Price with Crude Oil at $110/Barrel (USD/Barrel) 
Source: New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline Regular Spot Price FOB (Dollars per Gallon), Monthly, EIA 
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Figure 4.1.1.3 Historical Ethanol and Predicted Ethanol Price with Crude Oil at $110/Barrel (USD/Barrel) 
Source: Ethanol Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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However, the predicted ethanol price suggests ethanol price would have been higher between the 
second half of 2008 and 2010 and between the second half of 2014 and the end of 2016 if crude 
oil price stayed at 110 per barrel. This has to do with ethanol more likely to be a complement to 
gas during the two periods as its production capacity only reached the blend mandate’s 
maximum cap in 2016. Meanwhile, as the average simulated gasoline price is lower between the 
second half of 2011 and the first half of 2014, historical ethanol price being higher than predicted 
ethanol price reflects this difference. 
 Due to the transmission through price link system in Figure 2.4.1, corn prices would have 
been higher between mid-2008 to 2010 and between the second half of 2014 and the end of 2016 
as shown in Figure 4.1.1.4 if crude oil price stayed at 110 per barrel as we compare the scenario 
to what really happened in Figure 3.3.1.1. Meanwhile, a lower minimum corn price between the 
second half of 2011 and the first half of 2014 reflects the lower simulated gasoline price when 
compared to the actual. Overall, the corn price would have been more stable if the price of crude 
oil stays at 110 dollars per barrel from January 2008 onward. 
4.1.2 Crude Oil Price Increases and Soybean Prices 
To investigate the implication of high crude oil price on soybean prices, we first predict 
the diesel price beginning January, 2008 using Model 3.1.0.1, and then use the predicted diesel 
price to calculate the predicted biodiesel price using Equation 3.2.2.2’. Lastly, we find the 
minimum soybean price using Equation 3.3.2.1’ based on the predicted biodiesel price. As we 
predict higher crude oil price will result in higher diesel and predicted biodiesel prices, we expect 
the crop market to crush more soybean for biodiesel production. This will lead to more soybean 
meal being available in the market, driving down its price. However, we assume the soybean 
meal prices in this simulation do not change from its historical values. 
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Figure 4.1.1.4 Historical Corn and Minimum Corn Price with Crude Oil at $110/Barrel (USD/Barrel) 
Source: Corn Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Figure 4.1.2.1 Historical Diesel and Simulated Diesel Price with Crude Oil at $110/Barrel (USD/Barrel) 
Source: New York Harbor Ultra-Low Sulfur No 2 Diesel Spot Price (Dollars per Gallon), Monthly, EIA 
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 Compared to the price difference trend in Figure 4.1.1.1, the price difference in Figure 
4.1.2.1 deviates in 10 of the months. However, none of the deviations is more than 5% of the 
average value of the simulated and historical diesel price in any month. For similar reasons for 
the case of gasoline, we believe these minor deviations will not disrupt the overall price pattern 
of simulated diesel prices. 
In Figure 4.1.2.2, the predicted biodiesel price does not provide a good prediction of the 
actual biodiesel price even after factoring in the absence of blenders’ tax credit in the production 
years of 2010, 2012, and 2015. While the simulated diesel price is higher than the actual diesel 
price during the period between August 2008 and March 2011, the predicted biodiesel price does 
not follow the actual biodiesel price closely. The spurious production pattern of biodiesel in the 
early years in Figure 2.2.2, however, could help explain the poor prediction. Nevertheless, for the 
period between April 2011 and February 2014, the lower predicted biodiesel price due to the 
lower diesel price corresponds to a consistently higher actual biodiesel price. Lastly, as the 
biodiesel production picked up in 2014 onward, the predicted biodiesel price tracks the historical 
price slightly better in a period of high-simulated diesel prices compared to the actual prices. 
Figure 4.1.2.3 shows the result of all the price transmissions reflected in soybean. Again, 
Equation 3.3.2.1’ does not include the processing cost of crushing soybean into soybean meal 
and oil because we do not have the data. In addition, using a calculated average processing cost 
under the zero profit condition may bring more problems into the minimum price in this 
simulation scenario. Thus, processing costs are not removed and the minimum soybean price is 
consistently higher than the actual price except during the period between September 2010 and 
December 2012. Since the simulated diesel price between April 2011 and December 2012 is 
lower than the actual, it could account for part of the difference. Moreover, considering the   
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Figure 4.1.2.2 Historical Biodiesel and Predicted Biodiesel Price with Crude Oil at $110/Barrel (USD/Barrel) 
Source: Biodiesel Price, Historical Biodiesel Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Figure 4.1.2.3 Historical Soybean and Minimum Soybean Price with Crude Oil at $110/Barrel (USD/Gallon) 
Source: 48% Soybean Meal Truck Delivery Spot Price/Illinois (USD/short ton); USDA, Daily, Bloomberg 
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spurious biodiesel production pattern in the past few years and the mandate premium it has 
always had in its price, it is also very likely that the biodiesel industry has not matured to fully 
use the entire soybean share it should have to establish a tight price link between biodiesel and 
soybean. 
4.2 When There Is No Blenders’ Tax Credit 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the U.S. government uses biofuel blenders’ tax credit and the 
biofuel blend mandate to support the industry among many other biofuel policies. In particular, 
the ethanol tax credit elapsed in 2012 while the biodiesel tax credit continues to exist but was 
allowed to elapse in 2010, 2012, and 2015 historically. In this simulation scenario, we investigate 
the implication of the removal of the tax credit on the prices of biofuels and crops. We assume 
no effects on energy and crude oil prices as we assume their supplies are exogenous. 
Figure 4.2.1 predicts overall ethanol prices would be lower without the tax credit. The 
minimum ethanol price lies below the actual price throughout the data range except in 
September, 2014 with the minimum price being 4 cents higher than the actual one.  In a 
competitive market where consumers are required to consume ethanol, ethanol retailers and 
blenders will lower the price when the tax credit is no longer available. 
In comparison, the price of corn without blenders’ tax credit in Figure 4.2.2 has more 
deviations. Since we link ethanol with corn prices in our model in Chapter 3, over-predictions 
and under-predictions of corn price can result from ethanol production capacity constraints. 
When we have over-predictions of corn price, ethanol producers earn positive profit and under-
predictions signal negative profit. For the brief period at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 
2009, minimum corn price falls below 0. If this would ever occur, owners would have stocked 
the corn to wait for a higher price in the ethanol market later among many other options. 
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Figure 4.2.1 Historical and Minimum Ethanol Price without Blenders’ Tax Credit 
Source: Ethanol Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
September, 2014
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Figure 4.2.2 Historical and Minimum Corn Price without Blenders’ Tax Credit 
Source: Corn Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Between October 2013 and October 2014, the significant over-prediction has to do with multiple 
factors. Besides corn having a good harvesting year, a bad winter and the shortage of rail cars 
resulted in marketing constraints while ethanol price remained strong (de Gorter, Drabik, and 
Just, 2015). As the ethanol blend volume reached its cap of 15 billion in the next two years, 
ethanol prices also had a tendency to fall due to production decision beyond the blend goal, 
resulting in less ethanol production profit and lower minimum corn price. Overall, the removal of 
the blenders’ tax credit should have led to lower corn price as ethanol production now takes up 
about one third of domestic corn production. 
 Figure 4.2.3 shows the minimum price of biodiesel. As we have mentioned in Chapter 3, 
the blend mandate regime is binding throughout our data period. As a result, retailers always sell 
biodiesel at a premium. In Figure 4.2.4, the minimum soybean price overall follows the real price 
and lies below it. The implication of the removal of the tax credit, however, is unclear at first. At 
one hand, the biodiesel industry claims the tax credit has very strong influence on production 
(biodiesel.org, 2017). If this is the case and assuming that U.S. does not acquire enough biodiesel 
through import to compensate for domestic production loss, historical biodiesel price would have 
been higher. On the other hand, even though domestic production will drop if the tax credit no 
longer exists, blenders may still acquire enough foreign import for the biodiesel market at the 
lower price. Based on what has happened in the history, the second scenario is more likely to 
happen though sudden increase in the price of biodiesel import has also happened in the past. 
Thus, we believe the removal of the tax credit is more likely to reduce the overall price of 
biodiesel during the period given that the international market can supply US with enough 
biodiesel to meet its annual blend goals. However, the price may also become more volatile if  
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Figure 4.2.3 Historical and Minimum Biodiesel Price without Blenders’ Tax Credit 
Source: Biodiesel Price, Historical Biodiesel Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Figure 4.2.4 Historical Soybean and Minimum Soybean Price without Blenders’ Tax Credit 
Source: 48% Soybean Meal Truck Delivery Spot Price/Illinois (USD/short ton); USDA, Daily, Bloomberg 
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domestic industry fails to expand over time and international trade agreements change frequently 
between the US and its partners. 
 The price trend of soybean displays a different pattern. While soybean’s minimum price 
is lower than the actual historical price most of the time, there are periods when the minimum 
price lies above the actual price, such as for the period between July, 2013 and April, 2015. One 
possible cause was the volatile production during the period in Figure 2.2.2. As production levels 
keep changing, soybean price follows. However, such a relationship would require a strong price 
link between the two commodities and the current domestic biodiesel production level is still low 
relative to the production growth in ethanol production in the past few years.  
Table 4.2.1 Annual Production and Blend Goals 
Year Cellulosic 
Biofuel 
Goal 
Cellulosic 
Biofuel 
Production 
Biomass-Based 
Diesel 
Goal 
Biodiesel 
Production 
Advanced Biofuel 
Goal 
2009 NA NA 0.5 0.516 0.6 
2010 0.1 0 0.65 0.343 0.95 
2011 0.25 0 0.8 0.967 1.35 
2012 0.5 0.000020 1.0 0.991 2.0 
2013 1.0 0.000422 1 billion minimum 1.359  2.75 
2014 1.75 0.033 1 billion minimum 1.279  3.75 
2015 3 0.117 1 billion minimum 1.263  5.5 
2016 4.25 0.171 1 billion minimum 1.556  7.25 
2017 5.5 NA 1 billion minimum NA 9.0 
2018 7.0 NA 1 billion minimum NA 11.0 
2019 8.5 NA 1 billion minimum NA 13.0 
2020 10.5 NA 1 billion minimum NA 15.0 
2021 13.5 NA 1 billion minimum NA 18.0 
2022 16.0 NA 1 billion minimum NA 21.0 
Source: Program Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard Program, EPA/EIA Monthly Energy 
Review, Table 10.4/Public Data for the Renewable Fuel Standard, EPA 
In the RFS, biodiesel falls below the biomass-based diesel category and can be used to 
fulfill the annual blend goal of advanced biofuel, which includes cellulosic biofuel, biodiesel, 
and sugarcane ethanol (EPA, 2017). As shown in Table 4.2.1, though biodiesel production has 
met its annual goals most of the time in the past few years, the volume blend goals for both 
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cellulosic biofuel and advanced biofuel increase over years. Meanwhile, cellulosic biofuel 
production made significant gains in 2015 and is likely to expand at a faster pace with both 
technology and policy in place (Lane, 2016).  Whether we will have more biodiesel production 
in the future that will create a tighter price link between biodiesel and soybean depends on the 
production of cellulosic biofuel and sugarcane ethanol and any future policy change for biodiesel 
production.  
4.3 When There Is Tax Credit Throughout 
In this simulation scenario, we investigate the implication of the continuation of the 
biofuel blenders’ tax credit on the prices of biofuels and crops. In particular, we assume the 49.8 
cents ethanol tax credit continued to exist after December 2011 for the rest of the period and the 
1-dollar biodiesel tax credit was available in 2010, 2012, and 2015. Again, we do not study the 
change’s influence on energy and crude oil as we assume their supplies are exogenous. 
Figure 4.3.1 shows the simulated minimum price and historical price of ethanol. 
Compared to 4.2.1, the extension of the tax credit clearly raised the minimum price of ethanol. 
Depending on which regime is binding, historical ethanol price after December 2011 may have 
been higher or lower than this minimum price. However, based on what we have observed in the 
past and the assumption that blenders will bid up the price to fully take the blenders’ tax credit, it 
is very likely that ethanol price would have increased as a result of the tax credit extension. 
 With the tax credit extension, minimum corn price was higher after January 2012. 
Compared to the price level in the same period in Figure 4.2.2, the minimum corn price was 
above the historical corn price in Figure 4.3.2 during the same period most of the time even after 
taking into consideration of the period between October 2013 and October 2014. With ethanol   
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Figure 4.3.1 Historical and Minimum Ethanol Price with Blenders' Tax Credit 
Source: Ethanol Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Figure 4.3.2 Historical and Minimum Corn Price with Blenders’ Tax Credit 
Source: Corn Price, Historical Ethanol Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Figure 4.3.3 Historical and Minimum Biodiesel Price with Blenders’ Tax Credit 
Source: Biodiesel Price, Historical Biodiesel Operating Margins, CARD, ISU 
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Figure 4.3.4 Historical Soybean and Minimum Soybean Price with Blenders’ Tax Credit 
Source: 48% Soybean Meal Truck Delivery Spot Price/Illinois (USD/short ton); USDA, Daily, Bloomberg 
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production capacity stabilizing and the capping of the blend goals of the RFS, the corn price was 
very likely to increase due to the price premium in the biofuel industry. 
 When biodiesel receives a blenders’ tax credit throughout the period, the overall price 
premium of biodiesel decreased in Figure 4.3.3. In addition, the historical soybean price was 
below the minimum price during certain data periods. This suggests the two regimes may start to 
exist for the price relationship between biodiesel if the industry continues to receive the support 
and expand. This may eventually lead to a more competitive biodiesel market like that of 
ethanol. 
 Lastly, if the biodiesel market matured, the overall soybean price would have been higher 
than the actual price in Figure 4.3.4. This price pattern is similar to the results in Figure 3.3.2.2 
using the actual biodiesel price. However, depending on what the EPA does in the future for the 
annual blend goals of biodiesel, the tight price link between soybean and biodiesel that will 
induce such price transmission may take a few years to develop.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The motivation of this thesis is to study the price links between energy and crop since the 
beginning of the mass production of biofuels in the United States back in 2006 using a model 
that considers both biofuel policies and economic fundamentals. Despite the large amount of 
attention researchers have given to the study of the economics of biofuels, little work has 
included an individualized set of economic analysis framework for this policy-induced market 
whose behaviors differ from those of normal supply and demand frameworks. Building upon the 
theoretical framework of an economic model that specifically deals with biofuels, we explored 
the price relationships between energy and crop commodities and the sources of price 
divergence, tested the soundness of the economic model, simulated three market and policy 
scenarios to study market impact, and provided possible explanations when the predictions of 
these models deviate from what happened in reality. 
Overall, we believe input and output relationships and biofuel policies have created price 
links between the following commodity pairs: crude oil-gasoline, gasoline-ethanol, ethanol-corn, 
crude oil-diesel, diesel-biodiesel, and biodiesel-soybean oil. Price links exist between gasoline 
and diesel and crude oil, with crude oil being the main input for the two energy products. For the 
rest of the price links, however, due to the existence of two states of nature (the tax credit regime 
and the mandate premium regime) stemmed from the requirements of the Renewable Fuel 
Standard, the links between fuel-biofuel and biofuel-crop can become delinked at times.  
We tested hypotheses on binding regimes between commodity pairs. Based on the 
correlations between fuels and biofuels, diesel and biodiesel does not display the high mandate 
premium-low correlation pattern as predicted by the model while gasoline and ethanol shows the 
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opposite result. Moreover, while the price pattern of the minimum ethanol price and real ethanol 
price shows the existence of the two regimes, the comparison between the minimum corn price 
and the actual corn price suggests the mandate premium regime is binding throughout the data 
period. Lastly, both the minimum soybean and biodiesel prices correspond with each other in 
terms of the mandate premium regime being binding during the whole time. 
We then used the estimated economic model for three simulations: (1) what if the price of 
a barrel of crude oil stayed at $110 beginning January, 2008; (2) what if biofuel blenders’ tax 
credit did not exist from the beginning; and (3) what if biofuel blenders’ tax credit continued to 
exist throughout the data period. In the first scenario, when crude oil stays at 110 per barrel, 
ethanol prices increase due to the higher gasoline prices. This in turn would result in higher corn 
prices. The same pattern holds for soybeans. Higher crude oil prices lead to higher diesel and 
biodiesel prices that would push up soybean prices. In the second scenario, the removal of the 
blenders’ tax credit will result in overall lower ethanol and corn prices. However, the minimum 
corn prices without the tax credit does not always have to be lower than the actual corn prices 
due to factors like marketing constraints, international trade, and yearly production. Biodiesel 
prices have a slightly different story due to the continued expansion in domestic production and 
imports still capturing a significant market share may push biodiesel prices in different 
directions. However, the removal of the tax credit should reduce the overall price of biodiesel 
and soybean price will also decrease accordingly. Lastly, in the third scenario, the extension of 
the tax credit will increase ethanol and corn prices even after taking into considerations of 
ethanol reaching the RFS blend cap in 2016 and the good harvest of 2014. For biodiesel and 
soybeans, the extension increase prices but as the industry matures, we may start to see the tax 
credit regime to step in. 
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Despite the explanations we provide to account for some of the differences between 
model’s prediction and reality whenever possible, there still remains divergences unaccounted 
for and sometimes we cannot adjust price variables in response to other changes in the market to 
reflect a policy’s impacts. For example, we cannot explain why we obtained opposite results 
when we tested the hypothesis of high mandate premium leading to low gasoline and ethanol 
price correlation. Also, when we set crude oil to be 110 dollars per barrel, the crushing of more 
soybeans to produce biodiesel due to a higher diesel price will certainly lead to more soybean 
meal being available in the market at a lower price. However, the limitation of our model does 
not allow for a price adjustment and hence will certainly result in prediction errors in the trend of 
soybean price. To solve these issues, future research should develop structural models with 
policy-invariant parameters to disentangle the price links between energy and crop commodities. 
The beginning of the mass production of biofuel in the United States has great 
implications for the production patterns and price trends in the energy and crop markets. The 
intricate, nuanced, and evolving biofuel policies render the study of the interaction between the 
two markets challenging. We leave future work that shed more light on the open questions here. 
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